We address the generalized aggregative equilibrium seeking problem for noncooperative agents playing average aggregative games with affine coupling constraints. First, we use operator theory to characterize the generalized aggregative equilibria of the game as the zeros of a monotone set-valued operator. Then, we massage the Douglas-Rachford splitting to solve the monotone inclusion problem and derive a single layer, semi-decentralized algorithm whose global convergence is guaranteed under mild assumptions. The potential of the proposed Douglas-Rachford algorithm is shown on a simplified resource allocation game, where we observe faster convergence with respect to forward-backward algorithms.
I. INTRODUCTION
Aggregative games in societal challenges: An aggregative game is a collection of inter-dependent optimization problems associated with noncooperative decision makers, or agents, where each agent is affected by some aggregate effect of all the agents [1] . Remarkably, aggregative games arise in several societal challenges, such as demand side management in the smart grid [2] , e.g. for charging/discharging of electric vehicles [3] , demand-response regulation in competitive markets [4] , congestion control in traffic and communication networks [5] . The common denominator is in fact the presence of a large number of selfish agents, whose aggregate actions may disrupt the shared infrastructure, e.g. the power or the transportation network, if left uncontrolled.
Computational game theory and monotone operator theory: Designing solution methods for multi-agent equilibrium problems in aggregative games has recently gained high research interest. A fast-growing literature has been in fact developing semi-decentralized and distributed algorithms for aggregative games without coupling constraints [6] , [7] , and semi-decentralized algorithms for aggregative games with coupling constraints [8] , [9] . With focus on the generalized Nash equilibrium (GNE) problem, the formulations in [9] , [10] have shown an elegant approach based on monotone operator theory [11] to characterize the equilibrium solutions as the zeros of a monotone operator. Not only is the monotoneoperator-theoretic approach general but also computationally viable, since several design strategies to solve monotone inclusions are already well established, e.g. operator-splitting methods [11, §26] .
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Critical review of solution algorithms for aggregative games: Few algorithms are available in the literature for solving certain sub-classes of monotone aggregative games with coupling constraints, each with important technical or computational limitations. Specifically, forward-backward (FB) methods, that include projected-pseudo-gradient methods, require the pseudo-subdifferential mapping to be cocoercive [12] , strictly [7] or strongly monotone [10] , [13] . To be applicable to (aggregative) games with (non-cocoercive, nonstrictly) monotone pseudo-subdifferential mapping, the FB method shall be augmented with a vanishing regularization. This approach is known as iterative Tikhonov regularization (ITR) and generates a FB algorithm with double-layer vanishing step sizes. In practice, however, methods based on (double-layer) vanishing step sizes typically have slow speed of convergence, which is computationally undesirable. To solve (non-cocoercive, non-strictly) monotone aggregative games via non-vanishing iterative steps, the forwardbackward-forward (FBF) method adds an additional forward step to the FB algorithm. Recently, the preconditioned proximal-point (PPP) method was proposed to solve monotone (aggregative) games, virtually with no additional technical assumption other than monotonicity of the pseudosubdifferential mapping [14] . Unfortunately, however, the PPP method generates a double-layer algorithm, in which each (outer) iteration involves the solution of a sub-game without coupling constraints, via nested (inner) iterations. Together with vanishing step sizes, we can regard doublelayer or nested iterations as a computational limitation.
Why the Douglas-Rachford splitting?: Essentially, none of the currently available algorithms is suitable for efficiently computing a GNE in (general) monotone aggregative games. The Douglas-Rachford (DR) splitting [11, §26.3] has instead the potential to overcome the technical limitations of the FB and FBF methods and the computational drawbacks of the iterative-regulation and double-layer methods. Our motivation for studying the DR splitting is partially inspired by the celebrated Alternating Direction Method of Multipliers (ADMM) in distributed optimization, which is a special implementation of the DR splitting method [15] .
Contribution of this paper: Unfortunately, the direct application of the DR splitting on the classic monotone operator that defines the GNE problem does not generate a singlelayer algorithm. The second main technical difficulty is that the algorithms generated by the standard DR splitting method are not semi-decentralized. In this paper we resolve the two complications above. Our main technical contribution is to massage the implementation of the DR splitting method with an equivalent monotone inclusion defined on an extended space. In turn, we derive a single-layer, fixed-step, semidecentralized algorithm for the computation of a generalized aggregative equilibrium. Thanks to the semi-decentralized structure, the computational complexity of the derived algorithm is only mildly dependent (virtually, independent) on the number of agents. Finally, we show via numerical simulations that our algorithm inherits the advantages of the DR in terms of fast convergence.
Basic notation: R denotes the set of real numbers, and R := R ∪ {∞} the set of extended real numbers. 0 (1) denotes a matrix/vector with all elements equal to 0 (1); to improve clarity, we may add the dimension of these matrices/vectors as subscript. A ⊗ B denotes the Kronecker product between matrices A and B. Given N vectors
Operator theoretic definitions: Id(·) denotes the identity operator. The mapping ι S : R n → {0, ∞} denotes the indicator function for the set S ⊆ R n , i.e., ι S (x) = 0 if x ∈ S, ∞ otherwise. For a closed set S ⊆ R n , the mapping proj S : R n → S denotes the projection onto S, i.e., proj S (x) = argmin y∈S y − x . The set-valued mapping N S : R n ⇒ R n denotes the normal cone operator for the the set S ⊆ R n , i.e.,
for all x = y ∈ R n , u ∈ F(x), v ∈ F(y). J F := (Id + F) −1 denotes the resolvent operator of F ; fix (F) := {x ∈ R n | x ∈ F(x)} and zer (F) := {x ∈ R n | 0 ∈ A(x)} denote the set of fixed points and of zeros, respectively.
II. GENERALIZED AGGREGATIVE GAMES A. Mathematical formulation
We consider a set of N noncooperative agents, where each agent i ∈ N := {1, . . . , N } shall choose its decision variable (i.e., strategy) x i from the local decision set Ω i ⊆ R n with the aim of minimizing its local cost function (
which depends on both the local variable x i and on the decision variables of the other agents,
We focus on the class of average aggregative games, where the cost function of each agent depends on the local decision variable and on the value of the average strategyx, i.e.,
where M n := 1 N 1 N ⊗ I n and x = col(x 1 , · · · , x N ). Thus, for each i ∈ N , there exists a function f i : R n × R n → R such that cost function J i can be written as
Furthermore, we consider generalized games, where the coupling among the agents arises not only via the cost functions, but also via their feasible decision sets. In our setup, the coupling constraints are described by an affine function,
Thus, the collective feasible set, X ⊆ R nN , reads as
while the feasible decision set of each agent i ∈ N is characterized by the set-valued mapping X i , defined as
The set Ω i represents the local decision set for agent i, while the matrix A i and b i are local data which characterize how agent i is involved in the coupling constraints.
Next, we postulate standard convexity and compactness assumptions for the constraint sets, and convexity of the cost functions with respect to their local decision variable.
Standing Assumption 1 (Compact convex constraints): For each i ∈ N , the set Ω i is nonempty, compact and convex. The set X satisfies the Slater's constraint qualification.
Standing Assumption 2 (Convex functions): For all i ∈ N , and for all fixed z ∈ j =i Ω j and w ∈ 1
In summary, the aim of each agent i, given the decision variables of the other agents, is to choose a strategy x i that solves its local optimization problem, according to the game setup previously described, i.e.,
B. Nash vs aggregative equilibria
From a game-theoretic perspective, we consider the problem to compute a Nash equilibrium, as formalized next.
Definition 1 (Generalized ε-Nash equilibrium): A collective strategy x * is a generalized ε-Nash equilibrium (ε-GNE) of the game in (2) if x * ∈ X and, ∀i ∈ N and ∀z ∈ X i (x * −i )
If (3) holds with ε = 0, then x * is a GNE. In other words, a set of strategies is a GNE if no agent can improve its objective function by unilaterally changing its strategy to another feasible one.
The concept of aggregative equilibrium springs from the intuition that the contribution of each agent to the aggregation decreases as the population size grows. Technically, at the limit for N → ∞, the decision variable of agent i does not influence the second argument of its cost function f i .
Definition 2 (Generalized aggregative equilibrium): A collective strategyx is a generalized aggregative equilibrium (GAE) of the game in (2) ifx ∈ X and, for all i ∈ N and for all z ∈ X i (x −i )
Nash and aggregative equilibria are strictly connected. Indeed, under some mild assumptions it can be proven that every GAE equilibrium is an ε-GNE equilibrium, with tending to zero as N grows [16, §4] .
Under Ass. 1−2, the existence of a GNE and a GAE of the game in (2) follows from Brouwer's fixed-point theorem [17, Prop. 12.7] , while uniqueness does not hold in general.
C. Variational equilibria and pseudo-subdifferentials
Within all the possible equilibria, we focus on an important subclass, with some relevant structural properties, such as "larger social stability" and "economic fairness" [18, Th. 4.8] , that corresponds to the solution set of an appropriate generalized variational inequality 1 (GVI).
A fundamental mapping in noncooperative games is the so-called pseudo-subdifferential, F : X ⇒ R nN , defined as
Namely, the mapping F is obtained by stacking together the subdifferentials of the agents' objective functions with respect to their local decision variables. Under Assumptions 1−2, it follows by [17, Prop. 12.4 ] that any solution to GVI(X , F ) is a (variational) generalized Nash equilibrium (v-GNE) of the game in (2) . The inverse implication is not true in general, and actually in passing from the Nash equilibrium problem to the GVI, most solu-
Similarly, given the mapping F a : X ⇒ R nN , defined as
one can prove that every solution to GVI(X , F a ) is a (variational) generalized aggregative equilibrium (v-GAE) of the game in (2) . The remainder of the paper is devoted to design a semi-decentralized algorithm to compute a v-GAE.
III. GENERALIZED AGGREGATIVE EQUILIBRIUM AS ZERO

OF THE SUM OF TWO MONOTONE OPERATORS
In this section, we exploit operator theory to recast the GAE seeking problem into a monotone inclusion, namely, the problem of finding a zero of a set-valued monotone operator.
To make the resulting monotone inclusion suitable for the application of the DR splitting, we extend the original game in (2), by including an additional player. Specifically, let us introduce the extended game characterized by the following N + 1 coupled optimization problems:
1 Definition (Generalized variational inequality): Consider a closed convex set W ⊆ R n , a set-valued mapping Ψ : W ⇒ R n and a single-valued mapping ψ : W → R n . The generalized variational inequality problem GVI(W, Ψ), is the problem to find x * ∈ W and g * ∈ Ψ(x * ) such that (x − x * ) g * ≥ 0 for all x ∈ W . If Ψ(x) = {ψ(x)} for all x ∈ W , then GVI(W, Ψ) reduces to the variational inequality problem VI(W, ψ).
The next statement shows that the v-GNE of the extended game fully characterize the v-GAE of the original game.
Proposition 1: The joint strategyx is a v-GAE of the game (2) if and only if col(x,ȳ,σ) is a v-GNE of the game (6)- (7) , withσ = M nx andȳ i = A ixi − b i , ∀i ∈ N .
Remark 1: (a) The additional player in (7) represents the central coordinator, which does not participate in the game, i.e., f c (x, σ) ≡ 0, and whose "decision variable" σ must be equal to the average strategy, i.e., σ = M n x. (b) The additional local variables y i 's and constraint sets C i 's transform the original affine coupling constraints, i.e., Ax − b ≤ 0, into: N local constraints, i.e., (x i , y i ) ∈ C i , and one coupling constraint in aggregative form, M m y ≤ 0.
Next, we show that the v-GAE of the original game in (2) are zeros of a set-valued operator obtained by grouping the KKT conditions of the extended game in (6)- (7) .
With this aim, let us introduce the mapping T :
where
. Proposition 2: The following statements are equivalent: (i) x * is a v-GNE of the extended game in (6)-(7); (ii) ∃λ * ∈ R m ≥0 such that col(x * , y * , σ * , µ * , λ * ) ∈ zer(T ), with σ * = M x * , µ * = 0 and y * i = A i x * i , ∀i ∈ N . Now, we show that the set-valued operator T can be written as the sum of two mappings that are maximally monotone if the extended pseudo-subdifferential F e × ∂ σ f c is such. Thus, let us introduce the mappings
Standing Assumption 3 (Extended monotonicity):
The mapping F e × ∂ σ f c is maximally monotone.
Lemma 1: The mapping T in (8) can be split as T = A + B, with A and B as in (9)-(10). If Assumption 3 holds, then the mappings A and B are maximally monotone.
Remark 2: (a) Strong (strict) monotonicity of the pseudosubdifferential F in (4) is a usual assumption in the literature of noncooperative game theory [7] , [9] , [10] , [13] . Here, we postulate (non-strict) monotonicity of the extended pseudosubdifferential F e ×∂ σ f c . (b) Since F e (x, σ)| σ=M x = F a (x), Assumption 3 implies monotonicity of the mapping F a in (5) . By [17, Prop. 12.11] , this is a sufficient condition for the existence of a v-GAE of the game in (2).
IV. SEMI-DECENTRALIZED AGGREGATIVE EQUILIBRIUM
SEEKING VIA DOUGLAS-RACHFORD SPLITTING In this section, we derive a single layer, fixed step, semidecentralized algorithm to compute a v-GAE in aggregative games as in (2) . The algorithm is obtained by solving the monotone inclusion in Prop. 2(ii) via DR splitting.
A. Douglas-Rachford operator splitting
In Section III we show that the original GAE equilibrium problem is fully characterized by the monotone inclusion
where A and B are maximally monotone mappings. To solve (11), we adopt the DR splitting [11, Th. 26.11] , whose iterations for the mappings A and B are recalled next. Let (λ n ) n∈N be a sequence in [0, 2] such that
The DR method demands for the solution of some implicit equations to evaluate the resolvent operators J A and J B .
In the next subsection we discuss the semi-decentralized algorithm obtained by explicitly writing the iterations in (12) .
B. Semi-decentralized algorithm
Our DR algorithm works as follows:
Communication: At each iteration k + 1 of Algorithm 1, a communication round between the agents and the central coordinator takes place. Specifically, the agents forward their updated strategies, x k+1 i 's, y k+1 i 's, to the central coordinator, which receives this information in aggregative form, i.e.,
In turn, the coordinator broadcasts the updated multipliers, λ k+1 , µ k+1 and its strategy σ k+1 , to the agents.
Strategies update: At iteration k + 1, for all i ∈ N , the agent i updates its local actions x i and y i as in (13)- (14) . The term (A i λ k − 1 N µ k ) z in (13) is a penalization to satisfy the coupling constraints Ax − b ≤ 0 m and σ − M x = 0 n , while 1 2γi z − x k i 2 (I+A i Ai) is a weighted proximal term. The central coordinator updates the multipliers λ, µ and its strategy σ as in (15)- (17) . Remarkably, (15) coincides with the dual update of the projected-pseudogradient methods for generalized games [10] , [12] , [16] . On the other hand, the updates (16)-(17) make sure that the variable σ tracks the average state of the population,x.
The next table summarizes the proposed DR algorithm. ALGORITHM 1: Semi-decentralized Douglas-Rachford Initialization:
1. a) Local strategy update: for each agent i ∈ N
b) Communication: (x k+1 ,ŷ k+1 ) → coordinator.
2. a) Central multipliers and strategy updates:
b) Broadcast: (λ k+1 , µ k+1 , σ k+1 ) → agents.
In the next statement, we establish global convergence of Algorithm 1 to a v-GAE of the game in (2) .
generated by Algorithm 1 globally converges to some col(x * , y * , σ * , µ * , λ * ) ∈ zer(T ), with T as in (8), where x * is a v-GAE of the game in (2).
V. RESOURCE ALLOCATION GAME A. Illustrative problem setup
For illustration purposes, we consider a simplified resource allocation game. Specifically, we suppose that each agent has to complete a given task in n time slots. Let x i (h) ∈ [0, 1] be the ratio of the task that agent i allocates at time slot h, and u i ∈ [0, 1] n a personalized vector of upper constraints on the maximum allowed allocation for each time slot. The set of possible allocation vectors for agent i is therefore given by
Moreover, there exists an upper constraintb(h) > 0, for the sum among the local allocations, at each time slot h, i.e., N i=1 w i x i (h) ≤b(h), for h = 1, · · · , n, where w i ≥ 0 weights the contribution of agent i in the summation. The admissible joint strategy x, must therefore lie within the set
where b := col {b(1), · · · ,b(n) and A := w ⊗ I n , with w := col(w 1 , · · · , w N ). The aim of each agent i is to choose a strategy x i within (18) and such that (x i , x −i ) satisfies (19) , while minimizing its local cost function J i , defined as
where a i ∈ R >0 and Q i 0. (20) represents the cost for deviating from a pre-fixed allocation schedulex i plus an additional price that is proportional to the average allocation, M n x. Essentially, each agent has an incentive to allocate its task in time slots that are not congested by the other agents.
B. Numerical study
We consider N = 10 3 agents with n = 10 time slots and we randomly set their parameters as a i ∼ [1, 2] , w i ∼ [1, 2] ,
, for all j, k ∈ N , all with uniform distribution. We randomly generate the local and the coupling bounds as: 1 ū i = 2 and b i = b N , for all i ∈ N , with 1 2 Aū ≤ b ≤ 2 3 Aū to guarantee the feasibility and avoid redundancy in the constraints. The desired allocation vectors are set, for all i ∈ N , asx i := proj Ωi (e 1 ), where e 1 := [1, 0, · · · , 0] ∈ R n , namely, each agent wants to complete its task in the first time slot.
In Fig. 1 , we confront the convergence properties on the described scenario of the proposed algorithm versus the preconditioned Forward-Backward (pFB) algorithm in [12, Alg. 1] , modified to find a v-GAE. Specifically, to evaluate the convergence speed of the algorithms, we consider the sequence x k −x , i.e., the distance of the estimated solution at iteration k, x k , from the v-GAE of the game,x. Fig. 1 shows the mean value of the sequences x k −x over 50 simulations, for the DR and the pFB. We note that, on this scenario, the DR algorithm converges, in average, more than 10 times faster with respect to the projection-type algorithm.
VI. CONCLUSION
A particular massaged implementation of the Douglas-Rachford operator splitting is applicable to generalized aggregative games for the computation of an aggregate equilibrium via a single-layer, semi-decentralized algorithm. In our numerical experience, the derived Douglas-Rachford algorithm outperforms forward-backward, i.e., projectedpseudogradient, algorithms in terms of convergence speed.
APPENDIX
Proof of Proposition 1: Let us introduce the pseudosubdifferential mapping of the extended game in (6)- (7) U :
and the set of coupling constraints V, defined as
We recall that col(x * , y * , σ * ) is a v-GNE of the extended game in (6)- (7) if and only if it is a solution to GVI(V, U). It follows from [19, Th. 3.1] , that col(x * , y * , σ * ) solves GVI(V, U) if and only if there exist λ * and µ * such that the following N + 1 sets of KKT conditions are satisfied:
Note that (21)-(22) are satisfied if and only if σ * = M n x * , µ * = 0 (since f c (x * , σ * ) = 0), and for all i ∈ N
If we define z i = col(x i , y i ), then the first two inclusions in (23) can be recast in compact form as
Note that the last inclusion is satisfied if and only if
Hence, col(x * , y * , λ * ) satisfies the KKT conditions in (23) if and only if, for all i ∈ N ,
By [19, Th. 3.1], the pair (x * i , λ * ) satisfy (24) for all i ∈ N if and only if x * solves GVI(F a , X ), with F a as in (5) and X as in (1), namely, x * is a v-GAE of the game in (2) .
Proof of Proposition 2: The statement follows by noticing that (x * i , y * i , σ * , µ * , λ * ) satisfy the KKT in (21)-(22), for all i ∈ N , if and only if col(x * , y * , σ * , µ * , λ * ) ∈ zer T .
Proof of Lemma 1: The mapping A is the sum of 2 terms: (1) A 1 = N C × 0 d2 , which is maximally monotone since is the direct sum of maximally monotone operators [11, Prop. 20 .23], i.e., N C , normal cone of a closed convex set, thus maximally monotone, and 0 d2 , obviously maximally monotone; (2) A 2 = F e × 0 d1 which is maximally monotone by Assumption 3. The maximal monotonicity of A 1 + A 2 = A follows from [11, Cor. 24.4(i) ], since dom F e × 0 d1 = R d . The mapping B is the sum of 2 terms: (1)
which is maximally monotone for the same reasons of A 1 and (2) S which is a linear, skew symmetric operator, thus maximally monotone [11, Ex. 20.30 ]. Then, the maximal monotonicity of B 1 +B 2 = B follows from [11, Cor. 24.4(i)] since dom B 2 = R d .
Proof of Theorem 1 2 : The proof is divided in two parts: 1) We show that Algorithm 1 corresponds to the Douglas-Rachford splitting method in (12) applied on the mappings ΓA and ΓB, where Γ is a diagonal positive definite matrix that characterizes the step sizes of the algorithm. 2) We show that the mappings ΓA and ΓB satisfy the assumptions of [11, Th. 26.11] , which establishes global convergence to zer(ΓA + ΓB) = zer(A + B) = zer(T ). 1): The goal is to explicitly derive the iterations in (12) for the mappings ΓA and ΓB, where Γ 0 is defined as Γ := blkdiag(γ ⊗ I n , γ ⊗ I m , αI n , βI n , δI m ),
with γ = diag(γ 1 , · · · , γ N ) and α, β, δ, γ i ∈ R >0 , ∀i ∈ N . The next Lemma shows how to compute the implicit resolvents J ΓA and J ΓB in a semi-decentralized fashion. N ) , we obtain the iterations in Algorithm 1. To conclude, we recover the bounds on the step sizes since δ > 0 and β > 0 imply δ c ∈ (0,γ −1 ) and β c ∈ (0, 1 α+γ/N ), respectively. 2): The mappings A and B are maximally monotone, by Lemma 1, and zer(A + B) = ∅, by Remark 2. Since Γ = Γ 0, then ΓA and ΓB are maximally monotone in the space defined by the norm · Γ and zer(ΓA + ΓB) = zer(A + B) = ∅. Therefore, we can apply [11, Th. 26 .11] to establish the global convergence of the sequence col(x k , y k , σ k , µ k , λ k ) ∞ k=0 generated by Algorithm 1, to
